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Abstract
In light of the rising demand for biometric-authentication
systems, preventing face spoofing attacks is a critical issue
for the safe deployment of face recognition systems. Here,
we propose an efficient face presentation attack detection
(PAD) algorithm that requires minimal hardware and only a
small database, making it suitable for resource-constrained
devices such as mobile phones. Utilizing one monocular
visible light camera, the proposed algorithm takes two
facial photos, one taken with a flash, the other without a
flash. The proposed SpecDiff descriptor is constructed by
leveraging two types of reflection: (i) specular reflections
from the iris region that have a specific intensity distribution
depending on liveness, and (ii) diffuse reflections from
the entire face region that represents the 3D structure
of a subject’s face. Classifiers trained with SpecDiff
descriptor outperforms other flash-based PAD algorithms
on both an in-house database and on publicly available
NUAA, Replay-Attack, and SiW databases. Moreover,
the proposed algorithm achieves statistically significantly
better accuracy to that of an end-to-end, deep neural
network classifier, while being approximately six-times
faster execution speed. The code is publicly available
at https://github.com/Akinori-F-Ebihara/
SpecDiff-spoofing-detector.
1 Introduction
A biometric authentication system has an advantage over
a traditional password-based authentication system: it uses
intrinsic features such as a face or fingerprint, so the user
does not have to remember anything to be authenticated.
Among the various biometric authentication systems, face-
recognition-based ones take advantage of the huge variety of
facial features across individuals, and thus have the potential
to offer convenience and high security. Face authentication,
however, has a major drawback common to other forms of
biometric authentication: a nonzero probability of false re-
jection and false acceptance. While false rejection is less
problematic, because a genuine user can usually make a
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Figure 1: Construction of the proposed SpecDiff descriptor.
(a) Two photos, one taken with a flash (top), the other without
a flash (bottom), are shot within ≈ 200 milliseconds. (b)
Face and eye regions are extracted from the two photos and
resized, and the Speculum Descriptor (Dspec ∈ R3200 for
each eye) and the Diffusion Descriptor (Ddiff ∈ R10000) are
calculated from these regions. Two example results obtained
with live (left) and spoof (right) faces are shown. Note that
the actual region used to calculate DSpec is 40 × 40 pixels
square region inside the iris centered on the pupil. (c) The
two descriptors are vectorized and concatenated to build the
SpecDiff descriptor, which is then classified by standard
classifiers such as a support vector machine (SVM, [27]) or
a neural network.
second attempt to be authorized, false acceptance entails a
higher security risk. When a false acceptance occurs, the
system may actually be under an attack by a malicious im-
poster attempting to break into it. Acquiring facial images
via social networks is now easier than ever, allowing attack-
ers to execute a variety of attacks using printed photos or
recorded video. The demand for technologies for detecting
face presentation attack detection (PAD) is thus rising in an
effort to ensure the security of sites deploying face recogni-
tion systems. Face recognition systems are being used at, for
example, airports and office entrances and as login systems
of edge devices. Each site has its own hardware availability;
i.e., it may have access to a server that can perform computa-
tionally expensive calculations, or it may be equipped with
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Figure 2: The proposed Dspec and Ddiff , calculated and
averaged across the live face class (N = 1176, blue) and
the spoof face class (N = 1660, red). The ordinates have
arbitrary units (A.U.). (a) Vectorized Speculum Descriptor,
Dspec ∈ R3200, calculated from iris regions. (b) Vectorized
Diffusion Descriptor, Ddiff ∈ R10000, calculated from face
regions.
infrared imaging devices. On the other hand, it may only
have access to a low-performance CPU. It is thus natural
that the suitable face PAD algorithm will differ according
to the hardware availability. The advent of deep-learning
technologies has allowed high-precision image processing
that competes with human abilities at the expense of high
computational cost. On the other hand, there is still a need
for an efficient PAD algorithm that works with minimal com-
putational resources. In this study, we focus on this case:
PAD on a mobile phone equipped only with a CPU, without
access to external servers.
In line the goal of developing PAD technology independent
of hardware requirements, we decided to use one visible-light
camera mounted on the front of the mobile device, and have
devised an efficient, novel flash reflection-based face PAD
algorithm. The algorithm leverages specular and diffuse
reflections from the iris regions and the facial surface, respec-
tively. An all-white, bright screen is used as a flash simulator,
and two facial photos, taken with and without a flash, are
used to calculate the Speculum Descriptor, Dspec ∈ R3200
and the Diffusion Descriptor, Ddiff ∈ R10000. Both descrip-
tors are based on the difference between the two facial photos
and are normalized by the luminance intensities such that
the descriptor magnitude is bounded in the range [−1, 1],
thereby facilitating the training of classifiers and improve-
ment of their classification accuracy (Fig.2).
Testing on a small in-house database containing ≈ 1K
image pairs per binary class (live or spoof face), the proposed
descriptor classified with a support vector machine (SVM)
achieved the highest classification performance among other
flash-based face PAD algorithms. Generalizability across
different domains is verified by cross-database evaluation on
NUAA, Replay-Attack, and SiW databases; all classifiers
are trained on the in-house database and tested on the three
public databases. The results confirmed that the proposed
algorithm not only outperforms other flash-based algorithms
on the public databases but also achieves statistically sig-
nificantly better classification performance than that of a
computationally expensive, end-to-end deep neural network
that is six-times slower.
The proposed algorithm enables efficient, user-friendly,
and accurate PAD. Its contributions are summarized below:
1. Minimal hardware requirements: a single visible-light
camera and a flash light-emitting device.
2. Minimal computational requirements: implementable
on mobile devices.
3. Minimal database requirements: trainable with merely
≈ 1K image pairs for both live and spoof face classes.
4. Minimal data label requirements: no auxiliary supervi-
sion such as depth or segmentation is needed.
5. High detection accuracy, better than an end-to-end, deep
neural network model, but with six-times faster execu-
tion.
2 Related Work
The current PAD technologies aimed against spoofing at-
tacks are summarized below. Face spoofing attacks can
be subdivided into two major categories: 2D attacks and
3D attacks. The former includes print-attacks and video-
replay attacks, while the latter includes 3D spoofing mask
attacks. Several publicly available databases simulate these
attacks. To name a few, the NUAA [25] and Print-Attack [1]
databases simulate photo attacks. The Replay-Attack [5],
CASIA Face Anti-Spoofing [32], The MSU Mobile Face
Spoofing Database [29], and Spoofing in the Wild (SiW, [15])
databases contain replay attacks in addition to photo attacks.
The 3D Mask Attack Database [7] and HKBU-Mask Attack
with Real World Variations [12] simulate 3D mask attacks.
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Example countermeasures to each attack type are summa-
rized below.
2.1 Countermeasures to 2D attacks
Because of the reflectance of printed media and the use of
photo compression, printed photos have surface textures or
patterns that differ from those of a live human face, and these
textures can be used to detect print attacks. Replay attacks
are conducted by playing video on displays such as monitors
or screens, which also have surface properties different from
those of a live face. Here, local binary pattern (LBP, [5,6,17]),
Gaussian filtering [11, 21], and their variants can be used to
detect 2D attacks.
Infrared imaging can be used to counter replay attacks,
because the display emits light only at visible wavelengths
(i.e., a face does not appear in an infrared picture taken
of a display whereas it appears in an image of an actual
person [23]). Another replay-attack-specific surface property
is moiré pattern [8].
A prominent feature of these 2D attacks is the flat, 2D
structure of the spoofing media. Here, stereo vision [22],
depth measurement from defocusing [10], and flash-based
3D measurements [3,16,18,26] are effective countermeasures
that detect flatness as a surrogate of 2D spoofing attacks. In
this paper, we focus on using flash-based PAD to counter 2D
attacks.
Some algorithms, including ours, construct descriptors
from pictures taken with or without a flash. The following
four are mono-colored-flash-based algorithms: (i) LBP_FI
(LBP on the flash image), in which the LBP of a picture
taken with a flash is used as a descriptor [3]; (ii) SD_FIC
(the standard deviation of face intensity change), in which
the standard deviation of the difference between photos of
the same subject taken with and without a flash is used as
a descriptor [3]; (iii) Face flashing, in which the descriptor
is made from the relative reflectance between two different
pixels in one photo taken with a flash, i.e., the reflectance
of each facial pixel divided by that of a reflectance pixel
(hereafter abbreviated as RelativeRef [26]); (iv) implicit 3D
features, where pixel-wise differences in pictures taken with
and without a flash are calculated and divided by the pixel
intensity of the picture without the flash on a pixel-by-pixel
basis [18]. We compare these algorithms with ours in Results
section.
2.2 Countermeasures to 3D mask attacks
The recent 3D reconstruction and printing technologies have
given malicious users the ability to produce realistic spoofing
masks [14]. One example countermeasure against such a 3D
attack is multispectral imaging. Steiner et al. [24] have re-
ported the effectiveness of short-wave infrared (SWIR) imag-
ing for detecting masks. Another approach is remote pho-
toplethysmography (rPPG), which calculates pulse rhythms
from periodic changes in face color [13].
In this paper, however, we do not consider 3D attacks be-
cause they are less likely due to the high cost of producing
3D masks. Our work focuses on preventing photo attacks
and replay attacks.
2.3 End-to-end deep neural networks
The advent of deep learning has allowed researchers to con-
struct an end-to-end classifier without having to design an
explicit descriptor. Research on face PAD is no exception;
that is, deep neural network-based countermeasures have
been found for not only photo attacks but also replay and
3D mask attacks [19, 20, 31]. The Experiment section com-
pares our algorithm’s performance with that of a deep neural
network-based, end-to-end classifier.
3 Proposed algorithm
We propose a PAD algorithm that uses both specular and
diffuse reflection of flash light. The iris regions and the fa-
cial surface are used to compute the Speculum Descriptor,
Dspec, and the Diffusion Descriptor, Ddiff , respectively. The
two descriptors are vectorized and concatenated to build the
SpecDiff descriptor, which can be classified as a live or
spoof face by using a standard classifier such as SVM or a
neural network.
The procedure is as follows. During and after the flash
illumination, two RGB, three-channel photos are taken: P (f)
with a flash, and P (b) under background light. Since not all
front cameras of smartphones are equipped with a flash LED,
all display pixels are simultaneously excited with the highest
luminance intensity to simulate light from a flash. The flash
duration is as short as 200 milliseconds such that it does not
harm the user experience.
Before Dspec and Ddiff are calculated, the following com-
mon preprocessing functions are applied to both P (f) and
P (b):
• Function Rotation: make the facial image upright.
• Function GrayScale: transfer RGB images into
grayscale images.
• Function FaceDetection: detect face location
(Facecen) from each image.
• Function FeatExtraction: extract locations of facial
feature points (Faceloc) from each face.
• Function FaceCrop: crop the region of interest.
• Function GaussF ilter: apply Gaussian filter to in-
crease position invariance.
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Figure 3: Specular reflections from iris regions. (a) Region
of interest (ROI). A square ROI whose edge is one-third
of the horizontal eye length (“len” in the panel) is used to
crop the iris region. (b) Live iris pictures taken with (i(f))
or without (i(b)) a flash. (c) Spoof iris pictures taken with
(i(f)) or without (i(b)) a flash. Top row: a print attack with
a picture taken without a flash (P (b)). Bottom row: a print
attack with a picture taken with a flash (P (f)).
• Function Resize: resize the region of interest.
For face detection and facial feature extraction, the LBP-
AdaBoost algorithm [28] and the supervised descent method
[30] are used in combination. Note that because Gaussian
filtration is applied after cropping the region of interest, it
does not take significant calculation time compared to the
other processings. For the details of cropping, filtering, and
resizing, see sections 3.1 and 3.2.
The positions of the faces detected in the two photos may
potentially be different. However, because the flash duration
is as short as 200 ms, the positional difference does not cause
a major problem with face alignment.
3.1 Dspec: specular-reflection-based descrip-
tor
Unlike a printed photo or image shown on a display, the
human iris shows specular reflection (due to its curved, glass
beads-like structure) when light is flashed in front of it. Thus,
if P (f) is from a live face, a white spot reflecting the flash
appears, whereas in the case of a live P (b), a white spot
does not appear (Fig.3b). On the other hand, if P (f) and
P (b) are from a spoof face, a white spot appears in neither
of them, but if a flashed face is used as the spoof face, it
appears in both of them (Fig.3c). To utilize this difference
as Dspec, the iris regions are extracted from the cropped face
according to Faceloc. The iris regions are defined as two
square boxes centered on each eye, having an edge length
that is one-third of the horizontal length of the eye (Fig.3a).
A Gaussian kernel with a two-pixel standard deviation is
applied to each of the regions and then they are resized to
40 × 40 pixels. Hereafter, the extracted and resized iris
regions from both eyes are denoted as i(f) ∈ R40×40×2 and
i(b) ∈ R40×40×2. Pixel intensities at the vertical location
h, horizontal location w, and eye position s are denoted as
i
(f)
h,w,s and i
(b)
h,w,s. An intermediate descriptor S is calculated
by pixel-wise subtraction of i(b)h,w,s from i
(f)
h,w,s, which is then
normalized by the sum of the luminance magnitudes, i(f)h,w,s +
i
(b)
h,w,s, as follows:
Sh,w,s =

0 if i(f)h,w,s = i
(b)
h,w,s = 0
i
(f)
h,w,s − i(b)h,w,s
i
(f)
h,w,s + i
(b)
h,w,s
otherwise.
(1)
Because i(f)h,w,s and i
(b)
h,w,s are greater than or equal to zero,
Sh,w,s ∈ [−1, 1].
One potential weakness ofDspec is its sensitivity to change
in the position of the reflected-light spot. Depending on the
relative position of the subject’s face and direction of the
flash, the position of the white-reflection spot inside the
iris region changes. Although Gaussian filtering increases
positional invariance, the variance of the spot position is
much larger than the Gaussian-kernel width. Thus, to further
increase positional invariance, the elements of the vectorized
descriptor that are originated from each eye are sorted in
ascending order to obtain Dspec ∈ R3200 as follows:
S = vectorize(S)
Dspec = sort(S)
(2)
3.2 Ddiff: diffuse-reflection-based descriptor
Although it has been confirmed thatDspec by itself can detect
spoofing attacks, it has several pitfalls. Firstly, if a live
subject is wearing glasses, the lens surface reflects the flash.
The false-negative rate is increased when glasses-originated
specular light contaminates the iris-originated specular light.
Secondly, if a photo printed on a glossy paper is bent and used
for an attack, there is a slight chance that the flash will reflect
at the iris region of the printed photo, leading to increased
false-negative rate. To compensate for this risk, we propose
another liveness descriptor based on facial diffuse reflection,
called the Diffusion Descriptor or Ddiff . Ddiff represents the
surface structure of a face: live faces have the 3D structures,
whereas spoof faces have 2D flat surfaces. An intermediate
descriptor S is calculated from the pixel intensities in the
face region (in a similar manner to equation 1) as follows:
Sh,w =

0 if I(f)h,w = I
(b)
h,w = 0
I
(f)
h,w − I(b)h,w
I
(f)
h,w + I
(b)
h,w
otherwise
(3)
where I(f) ∈ R100×100 and I(b) ∈ R100×100 are face
regions in photos P (f) and P (b), cropped with rectangles
circumscribing all Faceloc, filtered with a Gaussian kernel
with a five-pixel standard deviation, and resized to 100× 100
pixels. Here, Sh,w ∈ [−1, 1] because I(f)h,w and I(b)h,w are
greater than or equal to zero. Unlike the case of Dspec, the
intermediate descriptor S is vectorized without sorting to
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preserve the spatial integrity of the face region:
Ddiff = vectorize(S). (4)
In light of the Lambertian model, we can understand why
does Ddiff represent the 3D structure of a face. Moreover,
the Lambertian model explains an additional advantage of
Ddiff : color invariance (also see [18]). This can be seen as
follows: assuming that the entire face is a Lambertian surface
(i.e., a uniform diffuser), the surface-luminance intensity
depends on the radiant intensity per unit area in the direction
of observation. Thus, the pixel intensity Ih,w at the vertical
position h and horizontal position w can be described as:
Ih,w = LKh,w cos θh,w (5)
where L, Kh,w, and θh,w denote the light-source intensity,
surface reflectance coefficient, and angle of incidence, re-
spectively. As equation 5 indicates, the luminance intensity
Ih,w depends on the 3D structure of the facial surface that
determines θh,w. Additionally, Ih,w depends on the surface
reflectance Kh,w. This means that differences in color of the
surface (e.g., light skin vs. dark skin) affect the observed
luminance intensity even under the same light intensity, L.
The design of equation 3 solves color-dependency problem
by canceling out the surface reflectance Kh,w. Under the
assumption of a Lambertian surface, the terms I(f)h,w and I
(b)
h,w
are expressed as:
I
(f)
h,w = L
(f)Kh,w cos θh,w + L
(f)Kh,w
I
(b)
h,w = L
(b)Kh,w
(6)
where L(f) and L(b) are the intensities of the flash light
and background light (ambient light), respectively. Since
ambient light coming from all directions is integrated, the
background-light term does not depend on the incident angle
of the light. Substituting I(f)h,w and I
(b)
h,w into equation 3 yields
the intermediate descriptor S:
Sh,w =

0 if I(f)h,w = I
(b)
h,w = 0
L(f) cos θh,w
L(f) cos θh,w + 2L(b)
otherwise.
(7)
Equation 7 depends on θ and represents the 3D structure of
the facial surface. Yet equation 7 is independent of the sur-
face reflectance K, thereby avoiding the skin-color problem.
Thus, although Lambertian reflections from the facial surface
can be modeled as a function of the surface reflectance and
surface 3D structure, equation 3 cancels K in order to confer
color invariance as an additional advantage to Ddiff .
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Figure 4: Classifiers. (a) SVM classifier applied to the calcu-
lated descriptors, Dspec, Ddiff , and SpecDiff . (b) ResNet4,
an end-to-end classifier taking I ′(f) and I ′(b) as a six-channel
tensor.
3.3 SpecDiff descriptor
The two descriptors are concatenated into the SpecDiff
descriptor:
SpecDiff = concatenate(Dspec,Ddiff) (8)
The SpecDiff descriptor attains higher classification accu-
racy compared to either Dspec or Ddiff alone. As both Dspec
and Ddiff are normalized in the range [−1, 1], SpecDiff
also has a bounded descriptor magnitude that helps model
training and classification. The experiments described below,
however, test not only SpecDiff ; the ablation studies test
Dspec and Ddiff by themselves.
4 Experiments
4.1 Databases
As of late-2019, there is no publicly available facial-image
database of images taken with and without a flash. Therefore,
we collected 1176 and 1660 photos of live and spoof faces
of 20 subjects, respectively. The images are taken under
two lighting conditions (bright office area or dark corridor
area), two facial-accessory conditions (glasses or nothing),
and three facial expressions (smile, mouth opened, or no
expression). Each condition has 4 or 5 repeats with vary-
ing backgrounds. Thus, for the live faces, one subject has
approximately 60 repeats. Spoof faces include flat-papers,
bent-papers, and displays. For the flat-paper conditions, one
subject has the same number of repeats as the live faces. For
the bent-paper conditions, one subject has approximately 12
repeats, including 4 bend directions (horizontal, vertical, and
two diagonal directions) and at least one lighting condition
(bright office area), two facial-accessory conditions (glasses
or nothing), and two facial expressions (two of the three ex-
pressions as above). For the display conditions, one subject
has approximately 10 repeats, including at least one lighting
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condition (bright office area), two facial-accessory conditions
(glasses or nothing), three facial expressions (smile, mouth
opened, or no expression). Thus, for the spoof faces, one
subject has at least 82 repeats in total.
To test the generalizability of the proposed method, a
cross-database validation is conducted using presentation at-
tacks contained in the three public databases, NUAA, Replay-
Attack, and SiW (test subset), which consist of 15 IDs / 7509
pictures, 50 IDs / 1000 videos, and 75 IDs / 1462 videos,
respectively, simulating photo and display attacks. For each
photo and video, we take images with and without a flash
to create test databases. These public databases are used
exclusively for testing models. For both in-house and pub-
lic databases, the device used for the data collection is an
iPhone7 (A1779), and the display-attack devices are an iPad
Pro (A1584) and ASUS ZenFone Go (ZB551KL).
4.2 Models
The classification performances of the proposed descriptors
are evaluated using SVM, either with a linear or radial ba-
sis function (RBF) kernel (Fig.4a). Libsvm package is used
for the SVM training [4]. Dspec, Ddiff , and SpecDiff are
compared with four previously reported flash-based descrip-
tors: SD_FIC (R, [3]), LBP_FI (R10000, [3]), RelativeRef
(R10000, [26]), and Implicit3D (R10000, [18]).
ResNet4 (Fig.4b) and ResNet18 [9] are constructed as end-
to-end deep neural networks. They take as input a six-channel
image that is constructed with two three-channel images I ′(f)
and I ′(b) concatenated along the channel axis. I ′(f) and I ′(b)
are facial images with and without a flash, undergone the
same preprocessing steps as the proposed algorithm, except
GrayScale and GaussFilter functions. The resulting input
image size is [244 × 244 × 6]. the last two layers, global
average pooling and FC layer of ResNet4 and ResNet18,
classify a 128-channel tensor into one of the two alternative
classes. We do not consider neural networks that are deeper
or more complex than ResNet18, because ResNet18 shows
significantly worse results compared to that of ResNet4 (See
Results section).
4.3 Evaluation metrics
Following ISO/IEC 30107-3 metrics, we calculated attack
presentation classification error rate (APCER), bona fide
presentation classification error rate (BPCER), and average
classification error rate (ACER).
One problem in evaluation is that we cannot access to the
live subjects appear in the public databases. Thus, we can
only evaluate APCER using spoof subjects either printed on
papers or projected on screens. In order to obtain metrics
equivalent to BPCER and ACER, we isolated a part of the
live faces of in-house database from the training dataset
and used them as a substitute for live faces of the public
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Figure 5: Two-way ANOVA comparing SpecDiff and
ResNet4. (s)BPCER and (s)ACER indicate that sBPCER and
sACER are used for evaluating public databases, while gen-
uine BPCER and ACER are used for evaluating the in-house
database. Resulting p-values show statistical significance in
APCER and (s)ACER.
databases. Although the live faces from the in-house database
are not exactly same as that of public databases, simulated
BPCER and ACER serve as conservative measures of the true
BPCER and ACER, because our in-house database contains
a variety of conditions such as lighting, facial accessory, and
expression. This heterogeneity leads to a broad, heavy-tailed
distribution of live face scores from the in-house database.
Hereafter we mention these simulated metrics as simulated
BPCER (sBPCER) and simulated ACER (sACER).
4.4 Speed test on actual mobile devices
To compare the execution speeds of our proposed algorithm
and ResNet4 under real-world scenarios, we built a custom-
made iOS application for PAD on Xcode 10.2.1 / MacBook
Pro, written in Swift, C, and C]. For Gaussian filtration,
an OpenCV [2] built-in function is used. The app is then
installed on an iPhone7 (A1779), iPhone XR (A2106), and
iPad Pro (A1876) for the speed evaluation. Execution speed
is measured during the preprocessing step and the descriptor
calculation/classification step.
5 Results
5.1 Classification performance
A leave-one-ID-out cross-validation is conducted on the in-
house database. At each validation cycle, all data from one
subject out of 20 IDs are separated as a test dataset. The re-
maining data from 19 IDs are used to train the models and to
determine thresholds. The results are summarized in Table1,
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Figure 6: Mean ROC curves of the cross-validation experiments. Note that only [0%, 10%] range is shown out of [0%, 100%].
(a) 10-fold cross-validation on the NUAA database. (b) 10-fold cross-validation on the Replay-Attack database. (c) 10-fold
cross-validation on the SiW database.
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Figure 7: Summary of execution speeds. The proposed
SpecDiff descriptor classified with the SVM-RBF kernel
is compared with ResNet4. Execution speeds on iPhone7,
iPhone XR, and iPad Pro are measured.
with the best model highlighted in bold. The average Dspec
and Ddiff calculated using the in-house database are shown
in Fig.2a and b, respectively.
To evaluate classification performances on the public
databases, we conduct 10-fold cross-validation. At each vali-
dation, model training and threshold determination are con-
ducted with randomly selected 90% of the in-house database,
while live faces of the remaining 10% together with spoof
faces from the public databases are used to compute sBPCER
and APCER. The results of the NUAA, Replay-Attack, and
SiW databases are summarized in Table 2, 3, and 4. Fig.6
shows the mean ROC curves of the top five models.
Among all the descriptors-classifiers combination, the pro-
posed SpecDiff descriptor with RBF kernel-SVM achieves
the highest classification accuracy on average, on both the in-
house database and on the three public databases. Moreover,
its accuracy is statistically significantly better than ResNet4,
the end-to-end deep-neural-network classifier. We conduct
two-way ANOVA with the two factors, model and database,
to test if APCER, BPCER, and ACER are significantly dif-
ferent. Model factor contains two members, SpecDiff
and ResNet4, and database factor contains four members,
in-house, NUAA, ReplayAttack, and SiW. The resulting p-
values of APCER and ACER are less than 0.001, indicating
that SpecDiff descriptor with SVM achieves significantly
better accuracy than ResNet4 (Fig.5). Following Tukey-
Kramer multi-comparison test show that SpecDiff achieves
significantly smaller APCER and ACER than ResNet4 on
each database (p < 0.001).
We observe statistically significant increase in APCER,
ACER and sACER using ResNet18, compared to the shal-
lower network, ResNet4 (p < 0.05). This is potentially due
to the lack of a large database: generally speaking, a deeper
neural network can benefit from its higher complexity and
nonlinearity to achieve a better performance, but with our
small in-house database, a simpler classifier with properly
designed feature performs better while a complex classifier
with a large number of parameters suffers from overfitting.
To test vulnerability to the two presentation attack instru-
ments, photo and display, the SpecDiff descriptor with the
RBF-kernel SVM is tested separately against photo and re-
play attacks by using the in-house, Replay-Attack, and SiW
database. Leave-one-ID-out-cross-validation is performed
on the in-house database. For the two public databases, SVM
is trained using an entire in-house database and tested with
the public database. As summarized in table 5, APCER of
the proposed model on display attacks of public databases
is comparable to its performance on photo attacks, although
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on the in-house database video APCER is slightly worse
(one-way ANOVA, p < 0.05).
To test vulnerability to the lighting conditions, we con-
ducted Leave-one-ID-out-cross-validation on the in-house
database, tested separately on the data taken in a bright office
area, and in a dark corridor area. The result summarized
in table 6 shows that variation in lighting conditions do not
significantly alter the classification performances (one-way
ANOVA, p > 0.05).
5.2 Execution speed on mobile devices
The results of the speed evaluation of the proposed algorithm
and deep neural network classifier on the iPhone7, iPhone
XR and iPad Pro are summarized in Fig.7. On all devices,
the proposed algorithm is approximately six-times faster in
terms of the descriptor calculation/classification time than
ResNet4.
Table 1: In-house database cross-validation errors (%).
Descriptor Classifier APCER BPCER ACER
SD_FIC [3] SVM
linear 26.15 47.36 36.76
RBF 24.85 48.43 36.64
LBP_FI [3] SVM linear 4.09 12.81 8.45RBF 1.73 10.53 6.13
Relative- SVM linear 2.11 80.31 41.21Ref [26] RBF 1.72 28.02 14.87
Implicit3D [18] SVM
linear 21.48 24.36 22.92
RBF 1.10 2.17 1.63
Dspec
SVM
linear 1.15 2.94 2.04
[PROPOSED] RBF 0.74 2.44 1.59
Ddiff SVM linear 1.67 2.89 2.28[PROPOSED] RBF 0.67 1.81 1.24
SpecDiff
[PROPOSED]
SVM linear 0.62 1.30 0.96RBF 0.36 0.79 0.58
ResNet4 1.49 1.88 1.69
ResNet18 9.72 2.25 5.98
Table 2: NUAA cross-database validation errors (%).
Descriptor Classifier APCER sBPCER sACER
SD_FIC [3] SVM
linear 18.58 56.90 37.34
RBF 27.21 50.66 38.94
LBP_FI [3] SVM linear 40.14 7.73 23.94RBF 21.55 16.49 19.02
Relative- SVM linear 23.12 2.85 12.98Ref [26] RBF 10.30 3.59 6.95
Implicit3D [18] SVM
linear 0.62 3.24 1.93
RBF 0.42 2.06 1.24
Dspec
SVM
linear 1.00 2.26 1.63
[PROPOSED] RBF 1.61 2.03 1.82
Ddiff SVM linear 0.84 2.05 1.45[PROPOSED] RBF 1.12 3.07 2.10
SpecDiff
[PROPOSED]
SVM linear 0.052 0.91 0.48RBF 0.021 0.83 0.43
ResNet4 6.50 1.39 3.94
ResNet18 55.61 9.07 32.34
Table 3: Replay Attack cross-database validation errors (%).
Descriptor Classifier APCER sBPCER sACER
SD_FIC [3] SVM
linear 40.62 58.15 49.38
RBF 33.22 49.98 41.60
LBP_FI [3] SVM linear 35.79 6.02 20.90RBF 2.11 22.07 12.09
Relative- SVM linear 27.74 2.12 14.93Ref [26] RBF 6.57 3.98 5.27
Implicit3D [18] SVM
linear 6.86 2.17 4.51
RBF 2.24 2.06 2.15
Dspec
SVM
linear 5.24 3.62 4.43
[PROPOSED] RBF 1.95 2.35 2.15
Ddiff SVM linear 9.56 2.61 6.08[PROPOSED] RBF 3.51 1.28 2.39
SpecDiff
[PROPOSED]
SVM linear 2.73 0.95 1.84RBF 0.25 0.98 0.62
ResNet4 2.71 1.28 1.99
ResNet18 35.32 0.97 18.14
Table 4: SiW cross-database validation errors (%).
Descriptor Classifier APCER sBPCER sACER
SD_FIC [3] SVM
linear 51.53 58.10 54.81
RBF 44.87 47.76 46.32
LBP_FI [3] SVM linear 14.98 5.43 10.21RBF 3.36 21.95 12.66
Relative- SVM linear 57.6 5.08 31.36Ref [26] RBF 25.68 3.98 14.83
Implicit3D [18] SVM
linear 9.40 3.01 6.21
RBF 36.16 0.62 18.39
Dspec
SVM
linear 16.66 2.76 9.70
[PROPOSED] RBF 5.79 2.66 4.23
Ddiff SVM linear 5.79 1.84 3.82[PROPOSED] RBF 3.61 2.71 3.16
SpecDiff
[PROPOSED]
SVM linear 2.86 0.91 1.88RBF 0.93 0.79 0.86
ResNet4 3.83 0.52 2.17
ResNet18 21.74 0.18 10.96
Table 5: Evaluation on spoofing subcategories by using
SpecDiff descriptor with SVM-RBF kernel classifier.
Database photo APCER video APCER
in-house mean 0.19 2.72
Replay 0.34 0.00
SiW 0.00 0.00
Table 6: Evaluation on different lighting conditions by using
the in-house database and SpecDiff descriptor with SVM-
RBF kernel classifier.
Lighting APCER BPCER ACER
Bright 0.27 0.94 0.61
Dark 0.0087 0.28 0.15
8
6 Discussion
Presentation attack detection (PAD) based on the SpecDiff
descriptor achieves the highest classification performance
among the flash-based algorithms tested. Moreover, its per-
formance is better than that of more complex end-to-end
deep-neural-network, ResNet4. The RBF kernel-based SVM
classifier has approximately 6.6 million floating operations
(FLOPs), while ResNet4 has 7 giga-FLOPs (which is larger
than the original ResNets due to the large input size, large
channel size, and lack of an initial pooling layer). Accord-
ingly, the proposed SpecDiff descriptor classified with
RBF kernel-SVM is approximately six-times faster than the
deep neural network. Additionally, the model requires only
a single camera and a single-colored flash light without an
additional imaging device (e.g., IR camera) or auxiliary super-
vision (e.g., depth information). Thus, the proposed model’s
high computational efficiency and minimal requirements will
enable it to have a wide range of applications.
The proposed Dspec is simple, yet it achieves competitive
classification accuracy. One drawback is, however, that its
accuracy is affected by the presence of eyewear. For example,
sunglasses occluding the eye region make the PAD impossi-
ble. Even with transparent glasses, specular reflection on the
lenses can potentially interfere with the descriptor. Because
of this drawback, it is recommended to use Ddiff simulta-
neously with Dspec. The combined SpecDiff descriptor
achieved top-tier classification performance in all the evalua-
tion schemes, indicating its robustness.
Both Ddiff and Dspec are based on the difference between
two photos, one taken with, the other without a flash, normal-
ized by the pixel intensities of the two photos. Because of
the normalization, the descriptors are bounded in the range
[−1, 1], and the classification accuracy is better than those of
unnormalized descriptors.
Our original database and both the Replay-Attack and SiW
database contain display attacks: photos or videos are played
on electronic displays such as smartphones or tablets. Theo-
retically speaking, displays violate the assumption regarding
Ddiff : equation 3 and 6 in the main text applies to a Lamber-
tian surface, whereas displays not only diffuse light but also
emit light by themselves, interfering with Ddiff . Despite the
violation of this assumption, the classification performance
of the proposed model on display attacks is comparable to
its performance on photo attacks (note that the classifica-
tion accuracy in table 5 can be better than that of table 3
and 4, because, in order to calculate the former, the entire
in-house database is used to train the model, while 90% of
the in-house database is used to train the latter because of the
cross-validation procedure). The high classification perfor-
mance independent of presentation attack instruments type
might have been because the subtraction in the numerator of
equation 3 cancels out the display-emitted light. Although
the emitted light increases the denominator, it decreases the
overall descriptor magnitude (i.e., it “flattens” the descriptor),
leading to the correct classification of a face as a spoofing
class rather than a live-face class.
Equation 7 indicates that if the background (ambient) light
intensity L(b) is too large, the elements of Ddiff will be con-
verged to zero, resulting in a “flattened“ descriptor. Similarly,
if L(b) is too small, the elements of Ddiff will be converged
to one, also resulting in a “flattened“ descriptor. Our experi-
ment testing dependency on the lighting condition, however,
showed that the classification accuracy of the SpecDiff de-
scriptor is not decreased depending on the background light
intensity (table 6 in the main text). Although under indoor
conditions we did not find a decrease in accuracy, we do not
recommend to use our algorithm in severer conditions, for
example, in a completely dark room or under direct sunlight
on the face, as equation 7 indicates. In order to achieve high
classification accuracy even under unfavorable conditions,
special hardware such as an infrared camera may be required
(e.g., Apple FaceID).
When implementing an algorithm for practical use, it is
generally difficult to choose one best algorithm, because
each algorithm has different hardware requirements. A deep-
neural-network model or high-resolution infrared-camera-
based PAD are powerful algorithms, but they require com-
putationally expensive processing units, a large training
database, or specialized imaging devices. On the other hand,
our proposed algorithm, with the SpecDiff descriptor clas-
sified with RBF kernel-SVM, is efficient yet effective, having
minimal hardware and database requirements suitable for mo-
bile devices, web cameras, and edge devices.
7 Conclusion
By using specular and diffusion reflection from a subject’s
face, the proposed algorithm based on the SpecDiff descrip-
tor achieved the best PAD accuracy among other flash-based
algorithms at execution speed approximately six-times faster
than that of a deep neural network. The algorithm requires
only one visible-light camera and a flash light. A small
database containing ≈ 1K image pairs per class with binary
labels is sufficient to train a classifier using the SpecDiff
descriptor, enabling the easy and wide application of the
PAD algorithm. Experiments conducted on the algorithm
operating on actual devices confirms that it has a practical
level of performance on mobile devices without the need for
computationally expensive processing units.
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